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Abstract: Private and public firms differ across a number of important dimensions. Public firms are 
under scrutiny by stock exchanges, regulators, and market participants and they share the feature of 
separation of ownership and control. Private firms, in contrast, are much less regulated, the nature 
of their agency problems is different, they are less exposed to market forces, litigation and publicity, 
and they operate in a much more opaque information environment.  The greater heterogeneity 
among private firms makes the role of auditing less obvious, which is reflected by auditing being 
made statutory in some countries while being voluntary in others. In this paper we highlight the 
differences between audits of private and public firms and review and synthesize the empirical 
evidence, which is sparse in comparison to what is available for public firms.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Regulators around the world have agreed that public firms must disclose audited financial 
statements.1 One reason is the positive welfare effect of reliable information of high quality. Audited 
financial statements are intended to lubricate capital markets by providing relevant and reliable firm-
specific information that enables more precise forecasts of future cash flows and reduced 
uncertainty, which ease access to finance and foster investment and growth. The improvement in the 
allocation of capital that is presumed to results from the proliferation of high quality financial 
information has led regulators to conclude that the benefits of statutory audits outweigh the cost for 
public firms.  
There is no consensus among regulators regarding the need for statutory audits of private firms. Part 
of the explanation is different stances on the role played by financial statements. In some countries, 
such as the US and Japan, private firms operate without any requirements by law to disclose financial 
statements (Arrunada 2011). In other countries, among those all countries in the European Union 
(EU), private firms must prepare financial statements and make them publically available.2 As 
financial statements are a prerequisite for statutory audits, differences in accounting regulation are 
important for understanding differences in the auditing regulation.  
Even if regulators agree that financial statements are important and thus mandatory for private firms, 
they may disagree about statutory audits. In the EU, Article 51(1) in the fourth directive requires 
mandatory auditing for all firms (European Commission 1978). However, member states may exempt 
the smallest firms from this audit obligation (Article 51(2)).  Figure 13, adapted from Collis (2010), 
clearly illustrates that regulators disagree about the need for statutory audits for the smallest firms. 
In 2005, all firms in Denmark, Sweden and Malta, even those with no sales, were required to prepare 
audited financial statements. At the same time, four countries (Cyprus, the Netherlands, Germany 
and the UK) mandated auditing only for firms with sales exceeding 7 million euro.  
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Auditing in private firms is an important topic. One reason is that research focusing on public firms 
may not be generalizable to private firms since they differ from private firms along a number of 
important dimensions. In addition the suppliers of audit services have different incentives and 
competences (we elaborate these below). Thus, it is not clear to what extent theory and empirical 
findings based on public firms can provide insight and guidance to regulators, standard setters, 
researchers and users of (audited) financial statements when it comes to auditing in the private firm 
segment of the economy.  
A second reason for focusing on private firms is their economic importance. Some examples: Private 
firms represent more than 99 per cent of all firms in the US and these firms account for more than 50 
per cent of the private sector GDP (Minnis 2011). Belgium has more than 250 000 firms and only 150 
are listed (Bauwede and Willekens 2004). More than 90 per cent of all registered companies in UK 
are private (Chaney, Jeter and Shivakumar 2004), and private firms account for 99.6 per cent of all 
businesses in Australia (Australia Bureau of Statistics 2001).  One type of private firm (SMEs) 
accounted for 67 per cent of total employment and 58 per cent of gross value added in the EU in 
2012 (Wymenga, Spanikova, Barker, Konings, and Canton 2012). Thus, it is apparent that 
understanding governance, growth and performance of the private firm is important for economic 
growth and prosperity for society at large; and auditors may play a key role as a provider or verifier 
of financial information and as an advisor to decision makers.  
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A third reason to focus on private firms is that they give new opportunities for the development and 
testing of theories and also for conducting more robust tests of existing theories. Our review shows 
that researchers into private firms typically have chosen topics and questions that previously have 
been analyzed for public companies. However, it is possible to ask questions that are directly 
relevant for private firms and also to conduct tests that are not feasible in a public firm setting. These 
opportunities occur because of the differences between public and private firms. Besides, the 
variation in tests and control variables is generally larger in the private firm segment, which enables 
more robust tests than is possible by focusing on public firms only. Also, a lower level of 
concentration of the big audit firms and lower litigation risks provide other incentives for auditors; 
and different market conditions and risk exposure are important in order to understand auditor 
behavior. Thus, the private firm segment is an arena for advancing theories and tests that should be 
utilized to a much greater extent than currently seen. One major challenge when studying private 
firms is of course the difficulties with access to data, but some data are available that have yet to be 
utilized.4 In addition the possibility of conducting field research in cooperation with audit firms may 
be better in the private firm segment, as the possibility of maintaining anonymity for both clients and 
audit firms is much greater due to the sheer number of clients and audit firms.  
In this paper we review the literature on audits of private firms, which is sparse compared to public 
firms. Francis, Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2011: 489) describe the state of affairs quite accurately: 
“Despite the importance of smaller entities to the economy and capital markets, surprisingly little is 
known about these firms with respect to their accounting and auditing choices or the economic 
consequence of these choices.”  
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by highlighting the differences between private and 
public firms and proceed by providing an overview of existing research. We divide the overview into 
four broad categories; i) ability to detect misstatements, ii) ability to report on misstatements, iii) 
audit quality differences between audit firms, and iv) auditor choice and client firm characteristics. 
Then we discuss directions for future research before a short summary concludes the paper. 
WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT PRIVATE FIRMS AND THEIR AUDIT? 
Private firms are different from public firms. Whether these differences increase or decrease the 
demand for auditing or make audits more or less important, is not clear a priori. Nor is it apparent 
without testing that results for public firms can be generalized to private firms (Hope, Thomas and 
Langli 2012). We highlight the major differences between private and public firm in this section. 
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One important difference between public and private firms is that the nature of the agency conflicts 
is different. Compared to public firms, private firms have much more concentrated ownership, 
especially greater ownership by managers, “major capital providers often have insider access to 
corporate information and capital providers may take a more active role in management (van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008: 449). Besides, family ties between CEOs and shareholders and 
between CEOs and board members are much more common (Hope et al. 2012). Furthermore, private 
firms operate in a substantially poorer information environment, disclose less non-financial 
information, their financial statements are less scrutinized by market participants, they have little 
capital-market pressure to hire high-quality auditors, and their financial statements may be more 
influenced by taxation, dividend and other political issues such as the intention to transfer the firm to 
the next generation (Chaney et al. 2004; De Franco, Gavious, Jin and Richardson 2011; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Hope et al. 2012; Sharma and Carney 2012). Thus there are weaker incentives for 
private firms to produce high quality financial statements and there is less agency conflict between 
shareholders and managers, but potentially more agency conflict between majority owners and 
minority owners (whether being members of the same family or not) and/or between owners and 
creditors and tax authorities. Thus the monitoring role of auditing may be more important in private 
firms (Lennox, 2005), but there are also arguments related to how private firms may solve moral 
hazard and asymmetric information problems that may make auditing less valuable in private firms 
(Cano Rodriguez and Alegria 2012). 
A second reason for focusing on private firms is that they may demand auditing for reasons not 
related to agency costs. We know that signaling that financial statements are free from material 
errors and that managers refrain from extraction of benefits on behalf of other stakeholders are 
important reasons why firms voluntarily hire an auditor when audit is not statutory, or voluntarily 
hire a high quality auditor when audit is statutory. In the private firm segment the demand for 
auditing may also reflect other reasons. For instance may a firm demand an external auditor to 
compensate for the loss of control that is inherent in hierarchical organizations as a longer chain of 
command reduces the top manager’s ability to observe subordinates’ actions (Abdel-Khalik 1993), to 
improve “operational efficiency and effectiveness due to auditor evaluation of internal processes, 
deterrence of management malfeasance, increased compliance with legal and regulatory constraints, 
and market permission to undertake certain activities (e.g., participate in public capital markets)” 
(Knechel , Niemi, and Sundgren 2008: 66), and to get access to competences not available in-house 
as private firms may not be able to afford employees with expertise in accounting, taxation and other 
business issues (Svanström and Sundgren 2012). “Consequently, the choice of auditor in any given 
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setting may be due to more complex factors than simply the reduction of external agency costs, 
especially for firms that are small or not publicly traded”  (Knechel et  al. 2008: 69). Thus there is 
much greater heterogeneity in the reasons why private firms hire auditors than for public firms. 
Not only are there important differences on the demand side of the audit market, substantial 
differences also exist on the supply side. Among listed firms, the market may be characterized as an 
oligopoly as the large international audit firms, currently Ernst & Young, KPMG, Deloitte and PwC 
(henceforth Big N) dominate.5 Their market share is over 90 per cent of public firms in most EU 
member states (ESCP Europe 2011), 72 per cent in Spain (Cano Rodriguez and Alegria 2012), 97.4 per 
cent among FTSE 350 firms in 2005 (Oxera 2006) and 52.3 [80] per cent in the Australian sample used 
in Goodwin (2011) [Salman and Carson 2009]. The United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO 2008) reports that the four largest accounting firms audit 98 per cent of the more than 1,500 
largest public US companies whereas mid-size and smaller audit firms audited almost 80 per cent of 
the more than 3,600 smallest companies.  
The Big N market share among private firm is more difficult to estimate as the data covering all 
private firms within a country is not easily accessible. However, there is no doubt that the Big N 
market share among private firm is substantially lower than for public firms, with large variations 
across countries: 28 per cent in Spain (Cano Rodriguez and Alegria 2012), 18.1 per cent in Norway 
(Hope et al. 2012), 34 per cent in Korea (Kim, Simunic, Stein and Yi 2011),  8.3  [6] {50} per cent in the 
UK samples used by Clatworthy, Makepeace, and Peel (2009) [Pittman and Lennox 2011] {Chaney et 
al. 2004}, while Van Tendeloo and Vanstaelen (2008) reports Big N market shares of 37.6 in Belgium, 
90.2 per cent in Finland, 14.4 per cent in France, 84.9 per cent in the Netherlands, 27.7 per cent in 
Spain and 45.6 per cent in the UK. When public and private firms are viewed as a whole, the market 
share of Big N firms is less than 26 per cent in 19 EU member states and between 35 and 44 per cent 
in Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK (ESCP Europe 2011). Taken together, the figures 
indicate that the audit market both among private and public firms is segmented with a large Big N 
dominance among the largest firms.  
The dominance of Big N, particularly among listed firms, has led regulators to worry about market 
concentration and how this may affect audit quality. Among EU regulators the concern is that the 
concentration gives large firms too few suppliers to choose from and that “concentration might 
entail an accumulation of systemic risk .. ” that could, if one of the Big N firm collapses, “disrupt the 
whole market”  (European Commission 2011). In the private firm segment the audit firms are mostly 
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small with a local anchor, and the market concentration is of less concern. However, a large number 
of suppliers of auditing services of which most are small create other threats to audit quality. 
In audits of SMEs, the audit team normally consists of very few persons and their audit firm and audit 
office are typically much smaller than those that audit large private firms and public firms. This 
influences auditor behavior in different ways and impacts audit quality. The incentive to provide 
audits of sufficiently high quality decreases for SMEs because the reputational capital at risk and the 
risk of litigation is reduced when auditing small clients with low publicity. Additionally, in small audit 
firms, the pool of colleagues to consult is smaller, the internal controls are less thorough and the 
internal monitoring mechanisms are weaker.  The risk of social bonding between auditor and client 
due to long-term relationships, local anchoring and familiarity is higher compared to public firms, 
which is a potential threat to independence. As an auditor’s reputation risk falls, when going from 
public to private firms, impaired independence due to economic bonding may also increase. On the 
other hand, the small size of the audit team makes potential synergies and spillovers gained from 
providing non-audit services (NAS) more easily transferable to the audit and thereby may increase 
audit quality. In sum, audit quality may be much more dependent on the experience, competence, 
judgment and integrity of the individual auditor in charge in smaller audit firms compared to large 
audit firms, and in particular compared to those that have been subject to extensive research: the 
auditors of public companies.   
The differences that exist between private and public firms are so large that we cannot rely on 
findings for public firms without careful consideration when we want to understand auditing in 
private firms, whether auditing is statutory or not.  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
In order to increase the reliability of financial statements and reduce agency costs, the audit has to 
be performed with high quality. Audit quality is much debated but, despite two decades of research, 
there is little consensus about how to define and measure audit quality (Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, 
Shefchik, and Velury 2012).  
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality in terms of the likelihood that the auditor discovers material 
misstatements in a firm’s reporting system and the likelihood that misstatements are reported. Even 
though audit quality is more multi-faceted than DeAngelo’s two-dimensional model suggests 
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(Knechel et al. 2012), the model is useful because much research into auditing in private firms fits 
how DeAngelo modeled audit quality. We therefore use that model as a point of departure.  
Ability to detect misstatements 
The first dimension in the audit quality definition is the likelihood of discovering misstatements, 
which depends on the auditor’s competence and level of effort. Few studies have analyzed how 
observable variables relate to competence and level of effort, and most of the research has been 
conducted at the audit firm level, using data from listed companies. However, during the last few 
years researchers have started to investigate how audit quality relates not only to audit firm factors, 
but also to audit offices, audit teams and the individual partner (see Francis 2011; Knechel et al. 2012;  
Sundgren and Svanström 2012b). These new approaches are relevant and necessary since complex 
auditing decisions are ultimately judgmental and taken by individuals or groups of individuals, and 
the evidence suggests that audit quality varies within and across each level of analysis whether being 
firm, office, team or partner. 
Competence/expertise 
The resources needed to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from 
material misstatements vary across engagements, and depend on the personnel, the abilities and 
expertise of the audit team, the audit technology and the audit methodology being used (De Angelo 
1981; Knechel et al. 2012). To put it simply, “audits are of higher quality when undertaken by 
competent people” (Francis 2011: 134). To some extent we might assume that auditors are 
competent based on general education requirements and CPA licensing, but individual auditor 
performance varies due to demographic, physiological and cognitive characteristics (Francis 2011).  
The expertise needed to detect material misstatements can be divided into i) general knowledge, ii) 
domain-specific knowledge and iii) client-specific knowledge. Work experience, participation in 
courses, seminars and other training activities are positively associated with an auditor’s ability to 
detect misstatements in general. Daily exposure to input from colleagues and to external expertise 
via internal reviews of on-going and completed audit work, and attendance at seminars with experts 
who present new or updated standards, laws, techniques and programs on a regular basis are also 
activities that aim at improving the general competence level. There are significant differences 
between large and small audit firms with regard to participating in such activities which we discuss in 
greater detail below. 
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Prior experience of auditing companies in the same industry generates domain-specific knowledge 
that improves auditor judgment. Evidence from public firms supports that industry experts 
outperform non-specialists in error-detection, in performing analytical procedures, in assessing 
components of audit risk and disclosing internal control deficiencies (Knechel et al. 2012). The 
potential relationship between industry expertise and audit quality has not gained much attention in 
private company research. Hope and Langli (2010) used industry expertise as a control variable in 
their audit fee regressions. They found a positive association between industry expertise and fees 
from provision of non-audit services (which may indicate that industry experts sell more non-audit 
services and/or charge higher fees for non-audit services), but no relationship between fees from 
auditing and industry expertise (if industry experts deliver audits of higher quality one might have 
expected them to earn higher fees).6  
Client-specific knowledge is of vital importance when conducting private firm audits, given the strict 
time budget for these assignments. Client-specific knowledge, such as knowledge of the client's 
accounting system and internal control structure, gives auditors comparative advantages in detecting 
errors, creates a significant learning curve for new auditors and significantly reduces start-up costs 
(DeAngelo 1981; Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds 2002). The literature that studies the relationships 
between audit quality, non-audit services (NAS) and auditor tenure acknowledges the importance of 
client-specific knowledge. Auditors gain knowledge from providing both auditing and NAS and they 
are able to utilize the same client-specific information for both services (Arruñada 1999). An auditor 
who consults on improvements to the client’s internal controls learns how the business operates and 
can draw upon that knowledge when conducting appropriate tests of internal controls during the 
audit process. Beck and Wu (2006) argue that auditors enrich their knowledge accumulation by 
performing NAS, which allows the auditor to anticipate and learn about changes in the client’s 
earnings dynamics. During long auditor-client relationships, the auditor learns about the client’s 
operations and systems which allows him or her to more easily identify areas with increased risk of 
material misstatements.  
Svanström (2012) studied private companies in Sweden and found positive associations between 
provision of NAS and measures of audit quality, thus suggesting that knowledge about the client is 
crucial in detecting and correcting material misstatements in financial statements of private 
companies. The importance of client specific knowledge in driving demand for services is 
documented by Svanström and Sundgren (2012), who found that the purchase of NAS from the 
incumbent auditor was positively associated with the length of the auditor-client relationship and the 
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perceived quality of the audit services. However, there were negative associations between both 
audit firm tenure and perceived audit quality and the purchase of NAS from an audit firm other than 
the incumbent one.  These findings suggest that, in private companies’ audits, client-specific 
knowledge is strongly related to the demand and quality of auditing and non-auditing services.  
Level of effort 
Competence must be accompanied by effort for the audit program to be properly planned and 
executed. Several factors influence how thoroughly the audit program is planned and executed, 
among them the auditor’s judgments about how agency conflicts influence the risk of material 
misstatements in financial statements, the size of the auditor’s portfolio, the incentives facing the 
auditor and the auditor’s working environment.  
The International Standards on Auditing (ISA) require auditors to assess several agency conflicts 
when assessing risk of material misstatements, for instance agency conflicts related to the firm’s 
ownership and governance structures (e.g. ISA 315 paragraph 11, 14, A17, A30). For instance does 
the presence of large shareholdings reduce the need for an external auditor to monitor the CEO since 
such shareholders have incentives and ability to monitor management on their own? In firms with 
dispersed ownership, however, the need for external auditing is likely to be higher since an individual 
shareholder lacks the incentives to carry the monitory costs because he receives only his fraction of 
the benefits of increased monitoring. As another example: the board becomes less independent if 
the CEO has family members on the board. Reduced independence means weaker board monitoring 
and, to compensate for a less independent board, the auditor should increase effort in order to 
“obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free for 
material misstatements, whether due to fraud or error” (ISA 240, paragraph 5). 
Hope et al. (2012) develop and test six hypotheses about how auditors should respond in the 
presence of agency conflicts. The results document that auditors adjust their level of effort as 
predicted by agency theory and the ISAs. Audit effort is negatively related to concentrated ownership 
and the presence of a second large shareholder, consistent with these shareholders’ incentives and 
ability to monitor management. Auditor effort relates negatively to CEO ownership, consistent with 
CEO-ownership aligning conflicts of interest between the CEO and owners. Family relationships 
between major shareholders and the CEO, and between the CEO and board members, are positively 
associated with effort, consistent with kinship and marriage resulting in reduced monitoring by 
owners and board members who belong to the same family as the CEO. Finally, they find that audit 
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effort is negatively associated with the proportion of board members from the largest family, 
consistent with there being fewer agency conflicts between owners and the board, and positively 
related to family relationships between board members and the CEO (suggesting a less independent 
board, as explained above). Two additional findings are worth noting since we return to related 
topics below. The first is that audit fees increase with leverage, consistent with auditors increasing 
effort in order to ensure the interest of debt holders. The second is that there is a Big N premium, 
consistent with Big N auditors being more sophisticated since they respond more strongly to agency 
conflicts.7 Overall the results show that auditors pay due attention to potential agency conflicts in 
firms’ ownership and governance structures and adjust their audit effort correspondingly.   
Portfolio size and career stage  
The size of an engagement partner’s portfolio is related to effort since one engagement partner has a 
fixed number of hours available per period. Therefore, having too many clients may force the 
engagement partner or members of the audit team to cut corners and simplify test procedures in 
order to meet time and budget constraints. Thus, being busy may increase the risk of material 
misstatements and/or erroneous audit reports. From other fields than studies of board effectiveness 
(i.e. nursing, supermarket cashiers and bank employees), research has shown that being more busy 
influences work performance negatively. Evidence from the auditing field, though not private 
company specific, shows that tight reporting deadlines following from time and budget pressure 
have the potential to compromise the auditor skepticism and professional judgment which are 
critical to audit quality (Coram, Ng, and Woodliff 2004). López and Peters (2012: 140) document that 
"compressed workloads impair audit quality and increase management’s ability to manipulate 
reported earnings" for US public firms. The documented behavioral outcomes from complying with 
time budgets are: i) premature signing off on an audit program step (one or more of required audit 
procedures are not completed), ii) reducing the amount of work performed on an audit step below 
what the auditor would normally consider reasonable, iii) failing to research an accounting principle, 
iv) making superficial reviews of client documents, and v) accepting weak client explanations (Kelley 
and Margheim 1990). We expect being busy to have at least similar consequences in private firm 
audits as the auditors are less exposed to risks of litigation and loss of reputation.  
The level of effort may also depend on where the engagement partner is in his or her career 
(Sundgren and Svanström 2012b). Young persons may be more willing to put in effort in order to 
achieve promotions and wage increases, while persons approaching retirement may lack the 
incentives and the desires that are necessary to deliver the same effort and performance as in 
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previous years. For instance, an auditor close to retirement has much less to lose economically if 
involved in an audit failure, since the negative consequences in terms of promotions and wage 
increases may be negligible compared to an auditor who recently entered the job market. The 
incentives to learn and implement improved audit test methodology may also be lower for auditors 
approaching retirement since the costs, which are born when learning new methods, may outweigh 
the expected benefit due to the period for collecting future audit fees being too short. Thus, career 
stage may impact audit quality.  
It is demanding to disentangle the effect of career considerations from experience. In early years of 
their career auditors gain experience by auditing companies in industries of different sizes and 
circumstances. Audit experience is often a precondition for promotion. When approaching 
retirement, auditors may be too familiar with the client due to a long-standing relationship, which 
has the potential to make the auditor indulge the client’s wishes and therefore reduce audit quality. 
Thus, the effect of experience and career concern may go in parallel and make it difficult to assess 
their individual impacts.   
Sundgren and Svanström (2012b) test if audit quality, measured by the propensity to issue a going 
concern modification, decreases with the engagement partner’s work load and closeness to 
retirement age, using a sample of 1,156 bankrupt Swedish companies. Consistent with concerns 
raised by regulators and oversight bodies, they find that audit quality relates negatively to the 
number of assignments and to closeness to retirement age. Goodwin (2011) studies public 
companies in Australia and finds negative associations between the number of assignments held by 
the audit partner and both earnings quality and audit fees. Gaeremynck, Van Der Meulen, and 
Willikens (2008) measure an audit firm’s portfolio size with a composite index based on the number 
of assignments and the size of the auditees, using factor analysis. They find no relationships between 
the size of the audit firm’s client portfolio and measures of audit quality, using Belgian data. Even if it 
is too early to conclude, these results may indicate that individual auditor characteristics are 
systematically related to audit quality but that differences in audit quality at the partner-level is 
uncorrelated with audit firm.  
Ability to report on discovered misstatements  
The second component of audit quality is the likelihood that an auditor will comment on any 
discovered misstatements and weaknesses in the audit report. This likelihood depends on 
professional skepticism, objectivity and independence.  
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Auditor independence is the cornerstone of the audit profession since independence is necessary for 
users of financial statements to trust the audit report. There are numerous factors and circumstances 
that may cause threats to auditor independence (see IFAC Code of Ethics). Perhaps the most debated 
and controversial issue among regulators, researchers and users of financial statements is the 
potential treat to independence caused by economic bonding between the client and the audit firm, 
particularly due to fees from the provision of non-audit services (NAS). Proponents of prohibiting 
auditors from providing consulting services argue that the auditor has economic incentives to 
acquiesce to client pressure in order to please the client and thereby increase the likelihood of 
obtaining future fees from auditing and NAS. While there are numerous studies on NAS and auditor 
independence in public companies, only a few researchers focus on private companies (Svanström 
2012; Hope and Langli 2010).    
There is a valid concern that provision of NAS to private companies negatively affects auditor 
independence and audit quality, but the threats to independence are somewhat different compared 
to those related to public firms. In general, auditors of private companies audit a large number of 
predominantly small companies, and fees from auditing and NAS from a single client are unlikely to 
significantly impact an auditor’s total compensation. At the same time, the risks of litigation and loss 
of reputation that act as guards of independence for public firms are substantially lower in private 
firms. As expected costs caused by loss of reputation and litigation fall, lower future fees are 
necessary in order for the auditor to be willing to compromise integrity. And since the fees from 
auditing may be limited due to the size of the client, future fees from providing NAS may become 
more important.  Social bonding due to long-standing relationships between the auditor and client 
may reinforce the risk of impaired independence, particularly if the auditor provides NAS and 
assumes a more managerial role. However, whether impaired independence due to economic and 
social bonding results in reduced audit quality is uncertain since better knowledge of the client may 
increase the auditors’ ability to deliver audits of high quality.  
Hope and Langli (2010) examined a large sample of private Norwegian firms and argued that studying 
private companies in a low litigation risk setting provided the best chances of finding evidence of 
impaired independence since the expected costs of delivering low quality audits is low. However, 
they found no association between auditors’ fees and the propensity to issue a going concern 
opinion. They state that “Although it is difficult to ascribe the results to a single factor, our findings 
are certainly consistent with auditors behaving with ethics and integrity in mind” (Hope and Langli 
2010: 598). Using a sample of Swedish firm, Svanström (2012) documents a positive association 
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between provision of NAS and audit quality measured by discretionary accruals and management’s. 
In sum, the two studies that have analyzed auditor independence in the private firm segment 
document no evidence that fees from auditing or NAS negatively affect auditor independence.  
Audit quality differences between audit firms 
Companies differ in their needs of and willingness to pay for auditing services, and because of these 
differences the suppliers of audit services have incentives to deliver services of different quality. 
Evidence of differences in the needs for auditing is most evident in countries where auditing is 
voluntarily and companies may choose between auditors of different quality. In such markets, some 
firms remain unaudited while others choose one or perhaps two auditors from local, national or 
international audit firms. When auditing is statutory, firms have fewer choices, but these firms may 
also choose auditors of different quality, i.e. choose a high quality auditor instead of a low quality 
auditor or engage two auditors if they wish to increase the credibility of their financial statements.   
Even though it is a strong simplification to categorize auditors into those of high and low quality (as 
quality varies on a continuum between high and low), it is useful because it allows us to pose the 
question: What distinguishes auditors of high quality from those with low quality? Referring to the 
definitions of audit quality given by DeAngelo (1981), quality must relate to characteristics of the 
auditor (which we have discussed above). Secondly, there must be variation in the effects of the 
audit, i.e. that high quality auditors are associated with more favorable outcomes than low quality 
auditors. For public firms, it is well documented that there are quality differences between audit 
firms, and that large audit firms, typically operationalized as the Big N audit firms, provide audits of 
higher quality than other auditors (Knechel et al. 2012). The evidence in the private company setting 
is sparse in comparison.  
We start by reviewing studies that analyze outcomes of the audit process. The outcomes are 
uncertain and impossible to observe and therefore researchers use indirect measures that may proxy 
for the outcome. Favorable outcomes or the absence of negative outcomes have been used as 
indicators of high audit quality. Knechel et al. (2012) group the outcomes into adverse outcomes 
(restatements, litigation), financial reporting quality (accruals, the association between earnings and 
stock prices, and conservatism), the accuracy of audit reports, and regulatory reviews of audit firms 
(peer reviews, inspections by oversight boards).8 The empirical evidence from private companies 
focuses primarily on audit quality differentiation between Big N audit firms and others with respect 
to earnings management, the accuracy of the going concern report, disciplinary sanctions against 
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auditors, and fees. Next we review studies that that have analyzed whether engaging an auditor or 
not when auditing is voluntary, or engaging a high quality auditor or not in a statutory auditing 
regime, gives easier access to finance, lowers cost of debt capital and leads to higher prices when 
firms are sold. Finally we review studies that have analyzed internal benefits, i.e. benefits that are 
gathered within the firm, such as more efficient production, shipping and handling.  
Financial reporting quality 
High quality auditors should promote high financial reporting quality, for instance by prevent 
earnings management. Using a sample of Belgium private companies, Van der Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2004) found no evidence that clients of Big N auditors engaged less in earnings 
management than clients of other auditors. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) documented lower 
levels of earnings management among clients of Big N auditors compared to clients of other auditors 
in high book-tax alignment countries (Belgium, France, Finland, Spain), but no such evidence was 
found in low book-tax alignment countries (UK and Netherlands). Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
suggest that Big N auditors constrain earnings management in high-tax alignment countries because 
financial statements are more closely scrutinized by tax authorities in these countries. As such, the 
likelihood of detecting audit failures is higher in high-tax alignment countries, which gives Big N audit 
firms stronger incentives to restrain firms from aggressive earnings management in order to protect 
their own reputation.  
The argument that auditors pay greater attention to their exposure to reputation and litigation risk 
when auditing private firms is supported by Cano-Rodrígues (2010), who analyze  two types of 
conservatism using a sample of private Spanish firms: Conditional and unconditional conservatism.9 
Cano-Rodríguez (2010) documents that Big N auditors are associated with higher conditional 
conservatism for firms of all sizes, indicating higher audit quality. However, unconditional 
conservatism is only observed for larger, high-leverage and low-growth firms, i.e. “firms with higher 
level of litigation and reputation risk for auditors” (Cano-Rodríguez 2010 p 132). The negative 
relationship between unconditional conservatism and the extent to which the client exposes the 
auditor to reputational or litigation risk, indicates that Big N auditors protect themselves by 
encouraging lower quality earnings for their most risky clients. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Ajona, Dallo and Alegría (2008), also using Spanish firms, who show that Big N auditors are 
associated with significantly lower discretionary accruals in the years prior to an auditee’s entering 
into bankruptcy, i.e. when a client’s financial condition exposes the auditor to increased risk.  
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Gaeremynck et al. (2008) move beyond the high/low dichotomy of auditors and analyze how 
measures of audit quality based on an auditor’s client portfolio relate to financial reporting quality 
(both disclosure quality and earnings management). They find that the size of the auditor’s portfolio 
is irrelevant, that having high visibility clients in the portfolio is associated with less earnings 
management (but no relationship with disclosure quality), and that less earnings management and 
better disclosure quality is associated with portfolios of clients with weaker financial health. The 
results in Gaeremynck et al. (2008) support the hypothesis that audit quality increases when the 
auditees increase the auditor’s exposure to risk of loss of reputation or to litigation.  
The accuracy of the audit report  
Upon completion of an audit, the auditor issues an audit report. The content of the report depends 
on what the auditor has discovered and what he prefers to report. Researchers have been 
particularly interested in the accuracy of audit reports with respect to going concern qualifications. 
Here, the auditors may make two types of error: Issue an incorrect going concern report (type I error) 
or issue an incorrect clean opinion (type II error). Type I errors are more serious than type II errors 
for the auditees, while type II errors are more serious for capital providers. This is because creditors, 
customers and investors may refrain from doing business with firms receiving going concern reports 
due to expected financial difficulties. Thus a going concern report may encourage an auditee’s 
stakeholders to take actions that reinforce the financial problems of the auditee. For the auditor, 
type II errors bring exposure to risks of litigation and loss of reputation, while type I errors may lead 
to the loss of future fees because the auditee may switch auditor.  
Ajona et al. (2010), analyzing bankrupt Spanish firms, find that Big N auditors more often issue going 
concern reports, consistent with protecting themselves from the risk described above. Gaeremynck 
and Willekens (2003) analyze 114 firms that filed for bankruptcy or voluntarily liquidation in 1995 or 
1996, matching them with 114 firms based on size, industry and year. They find no difference 
between Big N and non-Big N auditors with respect to whether auditees go bankrupt in the 
subsequent year. However, they show that Big N auditors more often issue going concern reports for 
firms that liquidate voluntarily, which suggests that Big N auditors are more sophisticated in 
detecting firms with financial problems and/or that they more likely report what they have detected.  
The results in Gaeremynck and Willekens (2003) are from a period when the going concern standard 
was principle-based, allowing auditors considerable discretion. The standard was replaced by a rule-
based standard in 2000. Carello, Vanstraelen,and  Willenborg (2009) analyze 132 firms filing for 
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bankruptcy during 1995-1996 and 89 firms filing for bankruptcy during 2001-2002, and match these 
firms with an equal number of financial stressed non-bankrupt firms using year, industry and 
probability of bankruptcy. Carello et al. (2009) find that non-Big N auditors committed more type II 
errors than Big N auditors when the standard was principle-based, but not after introduction of the 
rule-based standard. Furthermore, after introduction of the rule-based standard, they document an 
increase in type I errors, a decrease in type II errors and that there is no longer a negative 
relationship between going concern reports and an auditee’s size (which is found in almost all 
previous studies). In conclusion, they state that “the Belgian standard tends to favor creditors and 
disfavor auditors, and perhaps also companies and employees. Evaluation of the net of these effects 
depends on the priorities one assigns to the parties, an evaluation that we respectfully leave to 
Belgian standard-setters and regulators.” (p. 1425).  
Regulatory reviews of auditors  
The positive association between audit quality and the size of the audit firm/office/team that have 
been documented for public firms (Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010) might be even more 
apparent in audits of private companies since the audit is conducted, at one extreme, by auditors 
employed by Big N firms and, at the other extreme,by sole practitioners working alone . In these very 
different work environments, the levels of internal quality control systems, external input from 
colleagues and the auditors’ incentives vary significantly. Sundgren and Svanström (2012a) is the only 
study we are aware of that analyzes regulatory reviews of auditors in private companies. The 
researchers find that auditors working at offices with three or more CPAs were significantly less likely 
to be subject to disciplinary sanctions compared with auditors at offices with only one or two CPAs. 
The significant positive association between audit office size and audit quality was found for non-Top 
6 audit firms only (top 6 = Big 4 +BDO + Grant Thornton), suggesting that audit quality is more 
heterogeneous among small audit firms than among large audit firms and that small offices more 
often fail to meet the quality requirements.  
The Big N fee premium 
There is ample evidence using public firm data that large auditors charge significantly higher fees 
than smaller auditors. The fee premium that large audit firm earn can be caused by several (non-
independent) reasons, such as lack of competition among auditors, which is a primary concern 
among regulatory bodies; reputation and brand name effects; higher quality audits; higher 
production cost, better trained staff and more advance technology; and higher potential losses in the 
event of litigation (large audit firms have “deep pocket”) (Chaney et al. 2004, Clatworthy et al. 2009). 
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The existence of a fee premium has also been studied using samples of private firms, which has the 
advantage of reducing the effects that “deep pockets”, litigation risk, loss of reputation, and market 
concentration may have on fees. Thus, if the fee premium exists, the likely causes are not related to 
these effects. 
Chaney et al. (2004) use a large sample of UK private firms and find a fee premium for Big N firms 
using standard OLS-regressions, but no fee premium when they control for potential self-selection 
using the Heckman approach:  
“[The] results are consistent with the notion that auditees, when not compelled by market pressures 
to choose a Big 5 auditor, choose the lowest-cost auditor available; further, our results suggest that 
clients in our setting, on average, do not view Big 5 auditors as superior in terms of the perceived 
quality of services provided to a degree sufficient to justify a fee premium.” (p 70).   
Lennox, Francis and Wang (2012) raise doubt about the results in Chaney et al. (2004) due to how the 
Heckman test is implemented. Clatworthy et al. (2009), also using a large UK private firm sample but 
controlling for self selection bias using different methods, find results that directly contradict the 
findings in Chaney et al. (2004). They document a fee premium for Big 4 firms and find no evidence 
supporting the view that Big 4 clients choose the lowest cost auditor. Price premia for Big N auditors 
are also found in Belgium (Willekens and Achmadi 2003) and Norway (Hope and Langli 2010, Hope et 
al. 2012), and for the Top-6 auditors in Sweden (Sundgren and Svanström 2012a). 
Access to credit 
Most private companies need external financing, and their ability to raise equity may be limited by 
e.g. insufficient private wealth that the owners can invest in the firm or reluctance to open up for 
new owners. Therefore, gaining access to credit, primarily through banks, is often of vital importance. 
Audited accounting information and personal interviews are two important sources of information 
used by lenders (Berry and Robertson 2006). In the presence of asymmetric information, lenders may 
respond to uncertainty about a borrower’s creditworthiness by simply not accepting loan 
applications. Uncertainty may be reduced for firms that engage an auditor in a voluntarily audit 
regime, voluntarily hire a high quality auditor or two auditors in regimes where one auditor is 
mandatory, but may increase for firms that receive modified audit opinions.  
Hope, Thomas, and Vyas (2011: 937) use survey data from the World Bank (close to 50,000 
manufacturing and service firms from 68 countries) and find that audited financial information “is 
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associated with lower perceived financing constraints”. Allee and Yohn (2009), using private US firm 
data (see below), find that firms with audited financial statements have lower probabilities of getting 
a loan denial compared to firms with non-audited financial statements. Thus, both studies imply that 
auditing eases firms’ access to credit.  Niemi and Sundgren (2012) analyze if modified audit opinions 
reduce the likelihood of obtaining credit from institutional lenders among Finish SMEs and thus 
increase the use of trade credit, but they fail to find any relationship. The non-importance of 
modified audit opinion supports the experimental evidence in Wright and Davidson (2001) who 
analyze the effect of auditor attestation on commercial lending decisions. They found that bankers’ 
risk assessment and loan approval decisions for a privately-held company in the wholesale cleaning 
supply industry were not affected by whether there was no attestation, a review or an audit.  
Cost of debt 
One effect of reduced agency costs from auditing is that it reduces financiers’ lending costs. In a 
competitive market, this reduction will be passed on to lenders. Thus firms that voluntarily engage an 
external auditor are expected to obtain loans at lower interest rates than firms without an auditor.  
Blackwell et al. (1998) analyzed the association between actual interest rates paid and the degree of 
external verification of the borrowers’ financial statement for 212 small, private US firms, and found 
that audited companies pay lower interest rates than unaudited companies after controlling for firm-
specific risk factors and relevant loan characteristics. The size-matched sample showed that the 
interest rate of audited companies was 25 basis points lower than those of unaudited companies. 
The estimated interest saving was 30 to 50 per cent of audit fees paid. Minnis (2011) also finds 
significantly lower interest rates for audited firms using a large sample of private US firms (25,784 
firm-year observations from 12,616 unique firms from 2001-2007): The interest rate is on average 69 
basis point lower for audited firms (varying between 25 and 105 basis point depending on model), 
which amounts to an interest saving of 25,000 USD (or 6 per cent of net profit before tax) for the 
average sample firm. However, the US evidence is mixed, as Allee and Yohn (2009) and Cassar (2011), 
using data collected by the Federal Reserve Board in 2003 (the National Survey of Small Business 
Finances), do not find lower interest rates for firms with audited financial statements. These 
researchers use the interest rates on the firms’ most recent loans and they control for, among other 
things, the terms of the loan (e.g. fixed or floating rate and whether there is collateral for the loan). 
Lack of support for better terms on debt is also found by Fortin and Pittman (2007) who analyze the 
yield spreads and credit ratings on bonds issued by private firms. This is contrary to findings for 
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public firms, which are that Big N auditors are associated with lower cost of debt (see De Franco et al. 
2011) 
Kim et al. (2011) exploit the Korean environment, where all firms except those with total assets less 
than approximately USD 7 million are required to have their financial statements audited, to assess 
the effect the cost of debt.  Using a large sample (72,577 firm-year observations from the years 1987-
2002), they find a larger reduction in interest rates than those reported by Blackwell et al (1998). 
Depending on the estimation method used, the average interest cost savings from a voluntary audit 
range from about 56 to 124 basis points. They also report a significant reduction in interest rates for 
those that engage an auditor for the first time. 
The studies by Blackwell et al (1998), Kim et al. (2011) and Minnis (2011) analyze the effect on 
interest rates in environments where auditing is voluntarily. Karjalainen (2011) analyzed a sample of 
3,890 unique Finnish firms (10,799 firm-year observations from 1999-2006) that all were subject to 
statutory auditing. Subject to firm size, Finish firms may choose between auditors with no 
professional certification, HTM-auditors (which are regarded as the second-tier auditors) and KHT 
auditors (which are regarded as first-tier auditors). The Big N firms are also present in Finland and 
firms may also choose to have multiple auditors. Thus, there are different sets of auditors to choose 
from that have different degrees of perceived quality. Karjalainen (2011) documents that the 
presence of Big N-auditors or multiple auditors is associated with lower cost of debt. Karjalainen 
(2011) also finds that firms receiving modified audit opinions have higher interest rates (and lower 
accruals quality) than firms with clean opinions. Using Spanish data, Cano-Rodriguez and Alegria 
(2012) also find that Big N auditors are associated with lower interest rates for private firms (but not 
for public firms).  
Credit ratings 
Kim et al. (2011) and Minnis (2011) among others compute firms’ interest rates using information 
from the income statement and the balance sheet. Inferring interest rates from financial statements 
has several potential problems, see Cassar (2011) for a thorough discussion. To illustrate, it is more 
likely that unaudited firms have unrecognized liabilities compared to audited firms, since auditors 
perform checks that all liabilities are recognized with the correct amounts while no such controls are 
performed in unaudited statements. Thus, since liabilities are the denominator in the interest rate 
calculation, audited firms may by construction get lower interest rates and this may explain the 
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reduction in interest rates that are documented in studies using interest rates inferred from financial 
statements.   
Lennox and Pittman (2011) circumvent the problems with interest rate calculations by using credit 
rate scores as the dependent variable. Their purpose is to analyze if statutory auditing suppresses 
valuable information because a firm’s ability to signal low credit risk is reduced. In statutory audit 
regimes, firms may choose a high quality auditor or not, while in voluntary audit regimes they also 
have the option to not hire an auditor.  Lennox and Pittman (2011) utilize the change in audit 
regulation in the UK that made it possible for a number of private firms to opt out of an audit for the 
first time in 2004 (i.e. auditing was statutory for all sample firms in 2003, but not in 2004). The results 
show that firms that remain audited get a significant upgrade in credit rating while those that opt out 
get an even larger downgrade. Since there is no change in the assurance effect of auditing for those 
that remain audited, the upgrade can be attributed to the signaling effect for firms that for the first 
time are able to signal their willingness to be audited. The opt-out companies were less likely to 
appoint Big N auditors and paid lower audit fees under the mandatory regime relative to the 
companies that remained audited. The authors suggests that the benefits from requiring these 
companies to be audited are likely to be small since they privately contract for a low level of audit 
assurance when audits are legally required.  
The notion that auditing matters and is valued by credit rating agencies is further supported by Zerni, 
Haapamäki, Järvinen and Niemi (2012) who find among other things that private Swedish companies 
that engage two auditors have a better credit rating than companies hiring ‘only’ one auditor.   
Proceeds from sale of shares 
De Franco et al. (2011) analyze how audit choices impact share prices of private firms by testing if 
owners who sell all shares or firm’s assets obtain higher proceeds if they hired a Big N auditor. For 
public firms, research has documented that Big N auditors are perceived to provide higher audit 
quality than non-Big N, which for example explains why private firms that undergo an initial public 
offering (IPO) obtain higher IPO prices (see De Franco et al. (2011) for references). However, IPO 
firms are not comparable to those studied by De Franco et al. (2011) since only IPO firms can be 
expected to make heavy investments in governance systems prior to the IPO. Contrary to IPO firms, 
the firms analyzed by De Franco et al. (2011) provide no offer documents to investors, analysts, 
media or the SEC. Thus, to reduce information risk, the owners of the selling firms have incentives to 
hire high quality auditors.  De Franco et al. (2011) document substantial decreases in enterprise value 
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by not hiring Big N auditor. Different techniques give different estimates, but the drop in enterprise 
value varies from $1.9 million to $5.2 million in stock-purchased private firms, which is significant 
given that the median enterprise value ranged from $14 million to $18 million. The net benefit of 
hiring a Big N auditor is not analyzed, but since not all owners of private firms engage a Big N auditor 
prior to a sale the costs are likely to be substantial.  
Internal value of audits  
An audit may benefit the auditee because it may contribute to reduced internal agency problems or 
the auditor may e.g. suggest improvements in process efficiency and assist in regulatory compliance 
(Knechel et al. 2008). However, the potential internal benefits are likely to be highly individual and 
have not been given much attention in empirical audit research.  
Abdel-Khalik (1993: 35) argues that, while “fully private companies do not have the risk of moral 
hazard emanating from separation of ownership and control, they are subject to the problems of 
moral hazard “internal” to the operation of the firm.” When firms grow larger and delegation of 
responsibilities is necessary, direct supervision is no longer effective. Instead internal control systems 
serve as a way to control subordinates’ behaviors, and the audit may (via the feedback given to 
management) directly or indirectly enhance the quality and effectiveness of such systems. In essence, 
an audit can (partly) compensate for organizational loss of control in hierarchical organizations. The 
role of auditing for management control in more complex organizations is supported in Hay and 
Davis (2004). The fact that the firm hires an auditor is likely to reduce the risk that individuals take 
self-maximizing actions that are detrimental to the firm.  
Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt  (2004) found a positive association between demand for auditing in the UK 
and the degree to which management perceived the audit as i) improving the quality of financial 
statements, and ii) a control of internal books and records. These relationships are also confirmed in 
Niemi et al. (2012), using private company data from Finland. Audit serving as a remedy for 
weaknesses of internal controls may especially be the case in SMEs, where systems, controls, 
routines and policies are less formal and less developed.  Based on the outcome of the audit 
procedures, management may receive suggestions about how to improve internal controls and 
administrative routines. 
By hiring an auditor, the firm gains access to expertise. The possibility to ask the auditor for technical 
assistance and advice may be especially valuable for managers in SMEs which often lack competence 
in e.g. accounting and taxation. Svanström and Sundgren (2012) show that small private firms 
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frequently use the incumbent auditor for different types of non-audit services, while services 
provided by other audit firms are purchased only by a small proportion of firms. They find that the 
length of the auditor-client relationship and good experiences of the quality of audit work are 
positively related to the purchase of non-audit services from the incumbent auditor, but negatively 
associated with the use of consulting services from other audit firms. The role of the auditor goes 
beyond just providing assurance in many SMEs, but the NAS primarily lies within auditor’s core 
competence such as accounting, taxes and some legal issues, and only rarely includes more strategic 
support services such as budgeting and investments.     
Auditor choice and client firm characteristics 
The reasons why companies voluntarily engage an auditor, or choose a specific auditor in a statutory 
auditing regime, are complex and likely to vary across companies and countries. As for public firms 
there are certain characteristics related to size, complexity and risk that partly explain why firms 
choose a high quality auditor over a low quality auditor in a statutory auditing regime. The same 
variables are also important drivers of why firms voluntarily engage auditors when auditing is 
voluntarily. The variables capturing these characteristics are commonly incorporated as control 
variables in audit choice tests, and we do not discuss these variables here.  
As for public firms, private firm research documents positive associations between voluntarily hiring 
an auditor or a high quality auditor and agency conflicts measured as e.g. the degree of separation 
between ownership and management or level of (unsecured) debt (Carey et al. 2000; Chaney et al 
2004; Clatworthy et al. 2009; Collis et al. 2004; Hope et al. 20012; Knechel et al. 2008; Niemi et al. 
2012). However, the private firm setting has enabled researchers to advance our understanding of 
agency conflicts beyond what is possible when using public firms due to greater variation in the data. 
Lennox (2005) hypothesized that there is a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership 
(which varies between 0 and 100 per cent for private firms) and demand for high quality auditors 
measured by Big N auditors: “First, there is a divergence-of-interests effect, such that managers with 
smaller shareholdings have weaker incentives to act in outside shareholders' interests. Second, there 
is an entrenchment effect, such that managers with larger shareholdings have greater control over 
the company and therefore greater scope for acting in their own private interests” (Lennox 2005: 
207). Thus, the demand for high quality auditors is predicted to be higher at the low and at the high 
region of managerial ownership. Using a sample of large UK private firms, the hypothesis is 
supported. 
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The importance of agency conflicts are also documented by Hope et al. (2012) who use a sample of 
predominantly small and medium sized private firms.  They document that the likelihood of choosing 
a Big N auditor “decreases with ownership concentration, level of ownership by the second largest 
owner, and family relationships between the board and the largest owner” (p. 513). However, no 
relationship is found between the choice of a Big N auditor and CEO ownership in the main tests. 
Neither is any relationship found between choice of Big N and the family relationship between the 
CEO and the major shareholder and between the CEO and board members. Hope et al. (2012: 513) 
attribute the insignificant results to ”the trade-off between the benefits of more credible reporting 
from using a Big 4 auditor versus the potential costs of increased fees associated with a Big 4 auditor 
and the reduced ability of the CEO (or the CEO’s family) to extract resources from the firm.”  
Due to the multifaceted value of auditing, an audit may be demanded for other reasons than 
minimizing agency costs. The positive relationship between firm size and the voluntarily hiring of an 
auditor (Senkow et al. 2001, Collis et al. 2004 and Francis et al. 2011) could be caused by auditing 
generating  more multidimensional value for larger and more complex companies (Knechel et al. 
2008). Research in the UK and Ireland, summarized in Collis et al. (2004), shows that the main users 
of statutory audits are the directors of small companies. Further, Collis et al. (2004: 97) document 
that the primary determinants of auditing in small UK firms are managers’ perception “that audit 
improves the quality of information and/or provides a check on internal records” and the educational 
level of the principal director, and at these two factors are more important than firm size and agency 
relationships with lenders. Niemi et al. (2012), from a sample of Finnish private companies, identify a 
positive relationship between voluntary audits and use of an external accountant for financial 
accounting services, but a negative relationship between audits and use of tax advisory services from 
an external accountant. Taken together, audits seem to have a wider function in private companies 
than just working as a monitoring device for controls of agency conflicts.  
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our knowledge about auditing of private firms is sparse compared to that of public firms. This gives 
ample opportunities for research that advance theory and insight about the role of auditing in 
general and among private firms in particular.  
The role played by auditing in private firms is not clearly understood, which is probably caused by the 
heterogeneity of private firms (addressed above and further discussed below) and the difficulties of 
measuring the costs (of which the audit fee may be of minor importance) and the benefits of auditing. 
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Here, more research is needed. We need to address the issues with theories and tests that embrace 
the particularities of private companies in institutional settings and environment that differ from 
country to country.10  Thus, what does an audit really mean for private firms and why do private 
firms demand (high quality) auditors?  
The available empirical evidence is dominated by researchers that more or less have asked the same 
questions as those that have been addressed for public companies, adjusted for particularities of the 
private firm setting. While this is valid and important due to the differences that exist between public 
and private firms (as outlined above), the strategy does not take full advantage of the unique 
opportunities provided by the private firm segment.  Francis (2011) presents a general framework 
where six factors are seen as the drivers of audit quality: audit input; audit processes; accounting 
firms; audit industry and audit markets; institutions; and economic consequences of audit outcomes. 
Each of these factors is suited for analyses, and numerous examples of unanswered questions for 
researchers to investigate are given in text. Numerous questions are also found in Knechel et al. 
(2012) and Causholli et al. (2010). We believe these surveys will spur a researcher’s imagination and 
ingenuity when they are read with the following suggestions in mind: (i) Explain carefully why results 
for public firms may or may not generalize to private firms, i.e. why should we (not) expect 
something different? (ii) Develop ideas, theories, hypotheses and research designs that take 
advantages of the differences that exist between private and public firms, i.e. what can we learn 
from studying private firms that cannot be learned from analyzing public firms? (iii) Collect data from 
different sources using different techniques and utilize the greater variation in the data to conduct 
more robust tests than is possible using public firm data only. 
As shown above, a number of studies have tested if (higher quality) auditing lowers cost of debt and 
improves credit ratings for private firms. Two of these studies, Minnis (2011) and Pittman and Lennox 
(2011), are noticeable examples of excellent private firm research. The reason is not how they 
document benefits of auditing in terms of lower interest expenses or better credit ratings, but 
because they add new insight about the role of auditing in general. Minnis (2011) identifies a 
mechanism that makes audited financial statements more useful: The accrual component of earnings, 
which is the soft part of earnings subject to possible earnings management, becomes a better 
predictor of future cash flow. Pittman and Lennox (2011) are able to isolate the signaling effect of 
voluntary purchase of audit from the assurance effect. Therefore, they are able to document that 
mandatory auditing suppresses a company’s ability to send signals beyond what is possible when 
auditing is voluntary, and that “it is difficult to force companies to privately contract for stringent 
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audits if they would choose not to be audited voluntarily” (Lennox and Pittman 2011). We welcome 
more of these types of studies.  
In auditing research, it is common to measure e.g. industry specialism by the proportion of clients’ 
sales or assets within a particular industry and economic bonding by a particular client’s fees relative 
to the total fees from all clients. When such measures are computed using data from public firms the 
measures do not capture that audit firms also serves private companies. The resulting measurement 
errors may threaten the validity of the results as the measures computed using public data only may 
be systematically biased. There are numerous private firms that on average are as large as listed 
firms, and private firms outnumber public firms. Thus, we do not know how good a proxy the 
measures of e.g. industry expertise or economic dependence are, and if systematic measurement 
errors can explain some of the mixed results that exist.11 For those analyzing private firms, it may be 
important to account for the effects that can occur because some auditors of private firms also audit 
public firms (which is an easier task that analyzing public firms and control for auditors’ private firm 
activities due to public data being much easier available than private firm data).  
One caveat with many studies of private firms is their tendency to treat private firm as one 
homogeneous group.12 Lack of data that enable controls for firm heterogeneity beyond those 
captured by accounting numbers, industry affiliation, and auditor type is the likely cause of treating 
all private firms as equal. We accept that research implies making assumptions and simplifications. 
However, the correlated omitted variable problem deserves more attention in private firm research 
than in public firm research because the impact is likely to be more severe.13 An example is that the 
importance of heterogeneity in ownership and governance structures are often neglected, which 
raises the possibility that effects ascribed to test variables might disappear when adequate controls 
are included.  
A substantial subset of private firms is controlled by families.14 Family firms may have fewer internal 
agency problems than others because kinship and marriage align goals and incentives between 
managers and owners, but there are other differences. In their review article, Stewart and Hitt (2012) 
sort the differences between family and non-family firms into eight categories: ownership, 
governance, returns, rewards, networks, leadership, careers and management. For instance, family 
firms might differ from non-family firms “in their capacity to develop and leverage intangible assets 
such as social capital, trust, reputation, and tacit knowledge”, and “[e]conomic and financial 
performance may be compromised in preference for creating and preserving types of socioemotional 
wealth (SMW) such as perpetuating family name, values, control, and employment, or supporting a 
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desirable lifestyle” (Sharma and Carney 2012: 233). For such reasons, significant differences exist 
between family and non-family firms, and the family effect correlates with variables typically 
included in the tests such as size, growth and profitability, even though the results are mixed 
(Steward and Hitt 2012). More importantly, family variables are likely to correlate with the test 
variables used in audit research. For instance, the choice of a Big N auditor might correlate with 
family control because of less need to hire a Big N auditor due to fewer internal agency conflicts in 
family firms; the interest expenses might be lower in family firms because families  obtain better 
terms due to long-lasting relationship with the bank or higher willingness to use private wealth as 
collateral; and family firms might exhibit higher earnings quality because family owners fear that 
questionable accounting choices will damage the good name of the family if revealed to the public. 
Thus, there are reasons to expect systematic correlations between family variables usually not 
included in the tests and the variables that are of primary interest.15 The best solution to the omitted 
variable problem is to incorporate the relevant variables into the test or to use tests and methods 
that make the relevant variables redundant.16 If omitted variable problems cannot be avoided, the 
researchers should acknowledge the limitation and provide a caveat that makes the reader aware of 
this limitation and also discuss how omitted variables may impact the results.17   
Access to data on private firm is an obstacle in many countries – the data is simply not available or 
not as easily available as the data for public firms. This calls for wider search for available data 
sources. For instance do banks, credit agencies, tax authorities and other governmental agencies and 
international organization collect data which should be utilized by researchers? Another option is to 
collect data through surveys (see Allee and Yohn 2009 for a good example) or field research.  
Cooperation with audit firms and regulatory bodies may also give access to data. It may be easier to 
guarantee anonymity of audit firms and/or clients in the private firm segment compared to the 
public firm segment because there are many more audit firms and clients to choose from. We 
encourage greater ingenuity in how to obtain data.  
SUMMARY 
In this paper, we highlight the differences between audits of private and public firms and review and 
synthesize the relatively sparse empirical evidence on audits of private firms. Compared to audits of 
public firms, little is known about private companies in general and their auditing choices and the 
pros and cons of auditing of private firms in particular.  
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The traditional definition of audit quality is the ability to both discover and report on material 
misstatements. Existing evidence indicates that auditors take the potential negative effects of agency 
conflicts in an auditee’s ownership and governance structure into account when they plan and 
execute the audit program, to ensure that financial statements are free for material misstatements. 
To the extent that there is a systematic relationship between provision of non-audit services and 
audit quality, it seems to be positive, indicating that there is a spillover from provision of non-audit 
services to auditing. Audit quality seems to increase with client-specific knowledge and partner 
tenure, but decrease when auditors approach retirement age or when they become too busy 
(measured by number of assignments). The detrimental effect of being busy at the partner level may 
not be observable at audit firm level. However, the results indicate that audit quality is more 
heterogeneous among the smallest audit firms and that audit firms apply different strategies to gain 
market shares (including meeting the demand for low quality audits in statutory audit regimes). 
Contrary to the results for public firms, the apprehension that large audit firms deliver audits of 
higher quality than small audit firms does not receive unanimous support. Inadequate controls for 
auditee, audit partner/office/firm and country specific factors and different measures of audit quality 
may explain part of the mixed results. In short, our interpretation is that most studies indicate that 
Big N firms are more sophisticated, deliver audits of higher quality and charge higher fees than non-
Big N firms, and that the Big N firms’ incentives to deliver audits of higher quality increase with the 
extent to which the auditee exposes the audit firm to risk.   
The benefits of private company audits are multifaceted and vary considerably across companies. 
While agency factors are important drivers of voluntary audits and the choice of high quality 
auditors, there are also other drivers. The evidence suggests that voluntary audit eases access to 
credits, reduces cost of capital and improves credit ratings and can also to some extent be of internal 
value to the auditee. Overall, evidence suggests that audits of private companies are valued by users 
of audited financial statements (among them the management of the auditee is an important user), 
but whether or not benefits exceed costs is firm-specific.  
The private firm setting is different from the more homogeneous public firm segment. This makes it 
necessary to verify the generalizability of results from public firm studies. Even more importantly, the 
uniqueness of the private firm setting gives researchers opportunities to investigate questions that 
cannot be addressed using public firm data. Some of these questions may provide regulators with 
useful insights, for instance related to provision of non-audit services (no detrimental effect of non 
audit services has so far been found), the imposition of statutory auditing (which suppresses firms’ 
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abilities to signal their type because they are denied the option of voluntarily engaging an auditor) 
and the costs and benefits of auditing (none of the studies document cost of debt savings that 
exceed the direct audit fees paid by the client, and the total costs of auditing is likely to be high). 
Thus, by exploiting the particularities of the private firm segment, we believe researchers have great 
potential for advancing our understanding of the role of auditing.   
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1
 By public firms we mean firms that sell stocks or bonds to individual investors in public markets or have their 
stocks or bonds traded in organized markets. Private firms are non-public firms. The legal definition of public 
firms varies between jurisdictions, and in many countries public firms encompass more firms than those that 
are listed (Nobes 2010). Businesses may be organized in different legal forms and for non-listed firms a variety 
of legal forms are possible subject to national legislation. We restrict our discussion to firms with limited 
liability in order to easy the exposition. For the same reason we disregard not-for-profit organizations, 
municipalities, and firms that operate in industries with specific regulation due to their significance to the 
society or because they hold assets for a broad group of outsiders (e.g. financial institutions as banks and 
insurance companies, utilities, trade unions and charities). 
2
 The fourth EU directive sets out the minimum requirements for the preparation, content and disclosure of 
annual accounts for private and public firms, and the directive is implemented in all the member states. 
Member states may allow small firms to prepare abridged accounts and to only make the accounts available at 
the company’s registered office (European Commission 1978, article 47). In many EU countries national law 
requires filing of annual accounts by a public registry. The thresholds defining small companies are reviewed 
every fourth year. As of 2012 firms that do not exceed two of the three following criteria are regarded as small 
companies in the fourth directive: total assets ≤ EUR 4 400 000 €; net turnover ≤ 8 800 000 €; and average 
number of employees ≤ 50 (European Commission 2006). These thresholds set out the maximum values, and 
member states may decide lower thresholds. In 2009 it was proposed that micro entities should be exempted 
from the accounting directives (European Commission 2009). According to the proposal, micro entities are 
firms which on their balance sheet dates do not exceed two of the three following criteria: total assets ≤ 
500,000 €, net turnover ≤ 1,000,000 €, and average number of employees ≤ 10. 
3
 <<The figure will be updated>> 
4
 The empirical evidence we cover in this review uses data from Belgium, Korea, Finland, France, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US, which we assume partly reflects data availability and partly the domicile of 
the researchers. There are data available for a number of countries, and the Orbis database covers 65,000 
listed companies and more than 100 million private companies from around the world 
(http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/International/ORBIS.aspx, visited November 22, 
2012). In addition do tax authorities, banks, credit rating agencies, central banks, governmental statistics 
offices, and international organizations collect data which may be available for researchers. 
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5
 We refer to the largest international audit firms as Big N. Until 1989 there were eight firms (Arthur Andersen, 
Arthur Young & Co, Coppers & Lybrand, Ernst & Whinney, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price 
Waterhouse and Touche Ross). In 1989 the Big Eight was reduced to Big Six due to the merger of Ernst & 
Whinney and Arthur Young into Ernst & Young and the merger of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells and Touche Ross into 
Deloitte & Touche. In 1998 PricewaterhouseCoopers was formed by a merger between Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers & Lybrand, reducing Big Six to Big Five. When Arthur Andersen ceased to exist in 2002 after the Enron 
scandal, the number of large international auditing firm was reduced to four. 
6
 The relationship between fee and industry expertise is hard to interpret as “there is no clear consensus as to 
whether specialization leads to superior audit quality (i.e. effectiveness), increasing audit efficiency, or a less 
competitive market” (Causholli, De Martinis, Hay, and Knechel 2010: 171). 
7
 Niemi (2004), using actual billing hours from Finish auditing firms, finds that the larger audit firms deliver 
more audit hours than smaller audit firms.  
8
 Knechel et al. (2012) summarize the evidence for public firms and show that audit quality, proxied with these 
outcome measures, is positively associated with Big N-auditors, industry experts, experienced auditors and the 
size of the audit office. 
9
 Unconditional conservatism refers to the tendency to understate assets and/or overstate liabilities without 
considering economic outcomes. For instance may firm decide immediate expensing of all internally generated 
assets irrespective of whether capitalizing will give better matching of revenues and expenses or not. 
Conditional conservatism refers to the asymmetric treatment of unrealized gains or losses, where unrealized 
losses are charged to the income statement when expected while a much higher degree of certainty is required 
to recognize unrealized gains. Conditional conservatism improves contracting efficiency and is therefore 
viewed as increasing accounting quality. Unconditional conservatism does not since choosing alternatives that 
reduce income/assets/equity by default reduces the informational value of financial statements (for instance 
not capitalize internally generate assets when the asset meets the recognition criteria). 
10
 The environments faced by public firms in different countries are much more homogeneous compared to the 
environments that surround private firms. Also managers and owners incentives are more homogeneous due 
to the common need of satisfying the capital markets expectations regarding firm specific information and a 
competitive return.  
11
 Goodwin (2011), who analyzes Australian listed firms, finds that 29 percent of all audits are performed by 
audit partners that have only one or two clients and that the average auditors signs off 2,52 audits. It is hard to 
imagine that an auditor can be regarded as independent if all income comes from one or two clients. Thus, it is 
obvious that most auditors of public firms must have private clients. 
12
 This is not particular for auditing studies, but for also for studies in accounting (see e.g. Ball and Shivakumar 
2006 and Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006). 
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13
 
13
 Similar to accounting and auditing research using public firms, there is a selection problem also in private 
firm studies that might bias the results because firms are not randomly allocated to discrete groups (i.e. stay 
public or go private; voluntarily choose an auditor or not, choose a Big N auditor or not; and manipulate 
earnings or not). For discussion of the selection problem, we refer to Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012) and 
Clatworthy et al. (2009).   
14
  «Research suggests that 80 percent of all businesses in the United States are family owned (Daily and 
Dollinger 1992) and family businesses contribute between 50 percent and 60 percent of U.S. gross domestic 
product (Francis 1993; Upton 1991). Similar findings have been reported in the UK (Stoy Hayward and The 
London Business School 1989, 1990), Western Europe (Lank 1995), and Australia (Smyrnios and Romano 1994; 
Smyrnios et al. 1997). Providing further evidence of the contribution of family business to the economy, La 
Porta et al. (1999) and Schleifer and Vishny (1986) find that the ownership structure of even large public 
companies is characterized by controlling stockholders who are more often families, usually the founder or 
their descendants.» (Carey, Simnett, and Tanewski 2000 p. 37). 
15
 It may also be important to take into account that family firms by no means are free from agency conflicts. 
According to (Dyer 2006: 260), family firms may serve as “the breeding grounds for relationships fraught with 
conflict”. Thus, family firms are not homogeneous due to e.g. varying degree of family ownership and family 
involvement in boards and management. For instance are some founder-led while other are owned and 
managed by subsequent generations, which may have implications for family firms willingness and ability to 
take risk (Zahra, Hayton, and Salvato 2004: 364) and performance (Stewart and Hitt 2012).  
16
 Hope et al. (2012) incorporate variables capturing family ownership, family involvement in boards and 
management, and family ties between owners, board members and CEOs into the tests. Hope and Langli (2010) 
supplement association tests with change tests. Many variables that account for firm heterogeneity in 
ownership, board composition and management in private firms are stable over time, and if they are constant 
these variables disappear in the change tests. Cano Rodríguez and Alegría (2012) is an example of the use of 
panel data techniques that controls for unobserved firm-specific variables that are constant over time.  
17
 Minnis (2011) address omitted variables in one paragraph (in section 5.7). Cassar (2011) discusses Minnis 
(2011), and he greatly expands the discussion of how omitted variable may threaten the results in Minnis 
(2011). The strength of the discussion of omitted variable in both studies is that they exemplify by suggesting 
specific variables that are omitted.   
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